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Class Action Suits and Social Change:
The Organization and Impact of the
Hill-Burton Casest
P.A. PAUL-SHAHEEN*
HARRY PERLSTADT**
Class action suits permit an individual or group to bring to court issues
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated but otherwise not
specifically named. In many respects the existence of a class action suit
does not change the basic tasks of the attorney-to discover precedent
and to organize the best possible case for his or her clients. Class action
suits can, however, add a dimension to the legal process that is best
illuminated from a sociological perspective. This dimension encompasses
the nature and the social organization of the class, the involvement of
major social institutions as parties to the suit, the existence of social net-
works among attorneys, and the ability of class action suits to change
attitudes, behavior, and general social patterns.
An earlier version of this paper1 traced the precedent-setting judicial
decisions arising from a series of class action suits claiming that hospitals
receiving construction funds under the Hill-Burton Act2 had incurred an
obligation to provide free care and community service to the medically
indigent and poor. This article's shift in focus to the sociological perspec-
tive has required construction of a sociology of class action suits from
a wide range of theories and research. The article, therefore, opens with
some sociological perspectives on the relationship between the legal
system and social change with respect to class actions. A discussion of
the legislative history and intent of the Hill-Burton Act along with brief
summaries of the key class action suits follows. The article then addresses
several questions of concern to the legal community with respect to class
action suits: Is a class action suit a substitute for social organization? How
can courts implement decisions when social institutions must change to
t An earlier version of this article was presented at the American Sociological Associa-
tion Meetings in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Aug. 24, 1981.
* B.S. 1968, M.P.H. 1978, University of Michigan. Division Chief, Office of Local Health
Services, Michigan Department of Public Health.
** B.A. 1963, M.P.H. 1979, University of Michigan; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1973, University
of Chicago. Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University.
I P. Paul-Shaheen & H. Perlstadt, Judicial Influence on the Development of Health Policy:
The Case of Hill-Burton Litigation (1980) (article to be published in the International Jour-
nal of Medicine and Law (1982)) (article on file with Indiana Law Journal).
I Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1041 (1945)
(codified in scattered sections of 24, 31, 33, 42, 46, 48, 49 U.S.C.), as amended by the Hospital
and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, 5 3(a), 78 Stat. 447 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §5 291-291o (1976)).
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carry them out? What limits the ability of class action suits to bring about
changes in society?
THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Many legal scholars and sociologists have examined the question of
whether the law is an instrument or consequence of social change. Some
sociologists have claimed that the law is a product of previous social
activity,3 that it is intended to govern the relations among individuals
and groups in society,4 and that it generally reflects sentiments and in-
terests of social and class solidarities.5 From this perspective the law ap-
pears to lag behind social change and in fact acknowledges and legitimates
such changes.6 Others have argued that the law can be used as a force
to promote change,' to resolve social problems,8 to reform individuals,
or to alter the organizational structure of society. From this perspective
the law is an instrument of social change and it is society or segments
of it that lag behind the law.9 Regardless of the temporal relationship
between the law and social change, both perspectives tend to focus on
the ability of pressure groups, factions, and parties to influence the
legislative process that creates the laws and the normative system.
The law, however, is not only legislatively enacted, it is administratively
enforced and judicially upheld. Law is guaranteed by a bureaucratic staff
ready to apply legitimate means to secure compliance. The capacity and
willingness of administrative agencies to enforce the law varies, thereby
raising conflicts over consistency and fairness of enforcement. From this
perspective the law can be modified at the discretion of organizational
and individual enforcers."0 Finally, the law may be challenged on substan-
tive or procedural grounds. The court settles disputes by deciding which
side is right based on a normative standard such as a constitution or
3 See generally H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS (1963); E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIE-
TY (1933) [hereinafter cited as E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION]; E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF
SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1938) [hereinafter cited as E. DURKHEIM, RULES]; K. MARX & F. ENGELS,
THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY PARTS I & III (R. Pascal trans. 1947); W. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH
RESPECT TO CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE (1922).
' See generally id.
5 See generally Ross & Staines, The Politics of Analyzing Social Problems, 20 Soc. PROB.
18, 18-26, 32, 36 (1972).
6 See generally H. BECKER, supra note 3; E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION, supra note 3; E. DURKHEIM,
RULES, supra note 3; K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 3; W. OGBURN, supra note 3.
' Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TUL. L. REV. 787, 796-801 (1959).
' See Blumer, Social Problems as Collective Behacior, 18 SoC. PROB. 298, 304-05 (1971);
Contra A. Rose, Law and the Causation of Social Problems, 16 SoC. PROB. 33 (1968) (law con-
tributes to cause of social problems).
See generally M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE (1952); W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906).
I' See generally K. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966); P. MANNING, THE NARCS" GAME
(1980); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth
& C. Wittich eds. 1978); J. WILSON. THE INVESTIGATORS (1978); Parsons, The Lau' and Social
Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 56, 61 (W. Evan ed. 1962).
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accepted precedent." The judgment may vary from a narrow expounding
of the law to a broad interpretation and redefinition of the law. From
this perspective the meaning and intent of the law is judicially malleable.12
These premises can be examined within the context of what have been
termed norm-oriented movements."3 Many social actions commonly
designated as social movements or reform movements seek to establish
or repeal laws, rules, regulations, or standards, and successful norm-
oriented movements leave behind a legacy of formal proposals, new norms,
or normative organizations. The civil rights, women's rights, and welfare
rights movements occurring during the 1960's and 1970's have all used
law in one form or another as a fulcrum to bring about social change.
One particular strategy used successfully in the civil rights struggle
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) was the class action suit." Here the NAACP asked the judiciary
to establish new norms or authoritive standards for race relations based
upon existing constitutionally defined values of equality and opportuni-
ty. Used in this manner, a class action suit can be considered a norm-
oriented movement, one which seeks to change behaviors and social pat-
terns in order to realize existing social values. In contrast, value-oriented
movements seek to redefine what is good and transform society by
establishing a new order based on the new values. A distinction exists
between a "reform movement," which generally seeks to change the norms
of society, and a "value-oriented movement," which generally seeks to
change the values as well as the norms of society.
Once organized, reform or norm-oriented groups seek to change the
rules through either legislative action or judicial decree. While political
action represents a direct attempt to influence legislative bodies to change
the laws, class action suits represent an indirect attempt. When using
the court system to achieve reform, the discontented must find an at-
torney willing to take the case, a judge willing to hear the arguments,
and a defendant willing to follow court orders. The leadership of social
movements must formulate the belief in the cause and mobilize the
discontented to action.15 The recent prevalence and support for norm-
" Eckhoff, The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-resolution, 10 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 148, 158, 161-62 (1967).
,1 See generally G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1964); Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative
Mechanism, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 73, supra note 10, at 73-90; Foster, Public Law and Social
Change, in SOCIETY AND THE LAW 149-95 (F. Davis, H. Foster, C. Jeffery, & E. Davis eds. 1952).
,3 See generally N. SMELSER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1963).
" See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Corinth, 83 F.R.D. 46 (N.D. Miss. 1979); NAACP v. Lans-
ing Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Mich. 1976), affd, 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd
& remanded, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Beckett v. School Bd. of Norfolk, Va., 269 F.
Supp. 118, 123-24 (E.D. Va. 1967); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963), affd
per curiam, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
" See generally N. SMELSER, supra note 13; A. MAUSS, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AS SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (1975).
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oriented, nonmilitant reform movements on the part of public interest
attorneys has led several authors to suggest the existence of a new social
institution, the public law industry."0 The public law industry includes
the legal services sections of government-sponsored programs as well as
a number of private partnerships and firms which may be retained by
voluntary social reform groups and welfare organizations."7 The major
objective of such legal activity is to better the conditions of members
or constituents through administrative orders or judicial decrees. The
major strategy used to accomplish this end is the class action suit.
From a sociological perspective, public interest attorneys have enabl-
ed organizations involved in class action suits to resolve what has been
termed the "free rider" problem." A review of the background literature
on social movements indicates that most reform movements, including
those using class action suits, are highly vulnerable to this problem. 9 Such
a problem exists when a group achieves a benefit but cannot limit the
enjoyment of that benefit to themselves alone. It has been suggested that
the large dispersed membership often associated with social reform
movements means that economic and social benefits accruing to any in-
dividual or group would not provide sufficient incentives to organize and
to pursue and obtain the objectives." Only a separate and selective in-
centive will stimulate a rational individual or group to act in a group-
oriented way, and such an incentive must reward only those who are ac-
tive and work for the collective good.
One set of individuals who can be stimulated to initiate action is the
leadership of a mass movement or social reform organization. This leader-
ship group can enjoy social power and prestige above and beyond the
actual collective good which must be shared, and may evolve into a full-
time professional staff which leads the organization with the less active
members playing no serious role in the determination of policy. This is
possible when the staff receives outside funding and does not depend on
the feeble financial incentives provided by the membership." Reform
movements of a nonmilitant and more problem-oriented kind are often
led by middle and upper middle class college-educated professionals.'
,6 See generally Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW 42-79 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978); J. MCCARTHY & M.
ZALD, RESOURCE MOBLIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as J. MCCARTHY
& M. ZALD, MOBILIZATION]; J. MCCARTHY & M. ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN
AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION (1973) [hereinafter cited as J.
MCCARTHY & M. ZALD, TREND].
See generally Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, supra note 16.
,8 See generally J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978); M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
See generally M. OLSEN, supra note 18.
See generally id.
21 See generally W. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975); J. HANDLER, supra
note 18; J. MCCARTHY & M. ZALD, MOBILIZATION, supra note 16.
1 See generally A. MAUSS, supra note 15; A. OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (1973).
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Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the theorists and advisors of
a social reform organization engaged in litigation and class action suits
would be disproportionately drawn from the legal profession and organized
into public interest law firms serving various social reform groups.
The public interest lawyer can play a central role as intermediary be-
tween the social reform organization and the legal system which creates,
interprets, and enforces the rules and norms of society. This suggests
that the free rider problem could be overcome if public interest lawyers
had sufficient incentives to organize or support social reform movements
as well as construct and prosecute their class action suits. If this were
the case, then it would be difficult to distinguish between public interest
lawyers and political agitators. As an intermediary, however, the public
interest lawyer is faced with costs as well as benefits, both for himself
and for the reform movement he represents. His own costs extend beyond
the ability of the social reform movement to pay for his services to legal
ethics which frown upon organizing a case for his own personal benefit
and serving as counsel for his own class action.'
The conditions for a class action suit also involve the relationship be-
tween the benefits and costs of the social reform movement itself.4 On-
going social programs are assumed to serve a concentrated core of needy
beneficiaries with costs dispersed among millions of taxpayers or volun-
tary contributors. But quite often an attempt is made to expand the
number of beneficiaries or the scope of services provided to the point
where costs are no longer minimal for any individual or group. This means
that not only do the activists have to face a free rider problem, but the
potential concentration of costs will create a class of potential liabilitors25
who will oppose the movement.
When potential benefits are dispersed but the potential costs are con-
centrated, social reform movements will have difficulty organizing and
will face a protracted dual struggle: first to have their claims for broaden-
ing the number of beneficiaries or services recognized, and second to im-
pose the increased costs of such a program upon a few identifiable in-
dividuals, firms, or government agencies. The class action suit, almost
by definition, arises when potential benefits can be dispersed and potential
costs are concentrated. The class action suit also faces a double battle:
first to obtain standing in court so that substantive issues can be explored,
and second to win a declaratory decree or injunction ordering the expan-
sion of benefits and imposing costs upon the providers of those benefits.
I See Willis, Prerequisites for a Class Action, in THE NEW FEDERAL CLASS ACTION RULE
7, 10-11 (R. Clare ed. 1968).
24 See generally J. HANDLER, supra note 18; J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
Cf. generally Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 135 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
11 Those who voluntarily provide benefits are "benefactors," but no term exists for those
compelled to absorb costs without enjoying the benefits or receiving social rewards and
status from the deed. The authors suggest "liabilitors" for those who unwillingly foot the bill.
1982l
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The attempt to increase benefits does not always necessitate the concen-
tration of costs upon a few identifiable providers or resources. In fact,
the expected chain of events is that a group seeking to obtain benefits
will press for new legislation through the political process. One scholar
has argued that when a generalized belief exists that the regulation and
social control over agents responsible for the current state of affairs is
clearly inadequate to meet needs, two courses of action are possible."
The most likely is a normative reorganization- "there ought to be a
law"-and subsequent legislative remedies in the form of new statutes.
But a second or short-circuit course of action exists. It is possible to iden-
tify a specific flaw in the normative regulations and to correct that flaw
through favorable administrative or judicial decisions.
This second course of action involves the class action suit, and occurs
when benefits already exist, but are not adequately supplied or
appropriately dispersed. The nature of the class action suit requires that
the providers of the benefits be identified as defendants and the poten-
tial costs concentrated upon them. In this way, class action suits appear
to short circuit the expected chain of events and could be considered a
substitute for social organization and social reform movements.
THE HILL-BURTON OBLIGATIONS
This section presents a brief history of the Hill-Burton Act in order
to understand the origins of the legal controversies that followed. The
Act resulted from efforts by the American Hospital Association and other
hospital groups to consolidate wartime subsidies and continue federal fund-
ing for hospital construction after the end of World War II. The bill
was not proposed by either the Roosevelt or Truman administrations nor
by the leadership of Congress or the subcommittee on wartime health.
Rather, it was introduced in early 1945 by two junior Senators, Lister
Hill (D-Ala.) and Harold Burton (R-Ohio) 8 An examination of the express
language of the original draft reveals that the bill was primarily address-
ing the construction of facilities where needed rather than the provision
of health services to the needy. 9
See generally N. SMELSER, supra note 13.
See the Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 77-137, ch. 260, 55 Stat. 361 (1941) (omitted from
42 U.S.C. S 1521, 1532, 1541 [executed]; 1523, 1531, 1533-34 [obsolete]; 1551 [repealed by
the Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, ch. 649, § 802(b), 68 Stat. 590, 642] (1976)),
which provided for the construction of schools and hospitals, including private nonprofit
hospitals. This act prohibited the federal government from exercising any supervision or
control over the administration, personnel, or operations of nonfederally owned or operated
facilities. Id.
28 Hospital Construction Act: Hearings on S. 191 before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Hospital Construction Act
Hearings].
' Id. at 1-6.
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The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
where attempts were made to add coverage for health services to the
construction funds to create a comprehensive health package." The ad-
vocates for a national health insurance (Senators James Murray (D-Mont.)
and Claude Pepper (D-Fla.)) pointed out the incongruity of providing funds
to construct hospitals in communities that did not have adequate funds
to operate and maintain them." Murray concluded that such hospitals
would be forced to charge high fees for service and thereby deny access
to individuals unable to pay but in need of hospitilization.32
In subcommittee meetings, a compromise between these two positions
was reached. Language was inserted requiring that state plans assure
that hospitals constructed with Hill-Burton funds be open to all persons
in the community. (This requirement is hereafter referred to as the com-
munity service obligation.) Further federal regulations governing im-
plementation could require that an applicant hospital give assurance that
it would furnish a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to
pay. (This requirement is hereafter referred to as the uncompensated care
obligation.) These two requirements would become the focal points of the
class action suits.' The bill became law without further provision for
meeting maintenance or operating costs or for a national health insurance
program to assist people in paying their hospital bills. 4 The Surgeon-
General, and later the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (cur-
rently Health and Human Services), was authorized to make regulations
and perform such other functions as necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of the Act with the approval of a Federal Hospital Council." States
wishing to participate in the program had to designate a single state
agency for the development, administration, and supervision of state plans
for carrying out the provisions of the Act in accordance with the stan-
dards and regulations as prescribed by the Surgeon-General or the
Secretary.38
The entire program was voluntary for both states and individual
facilities and depended heavily on economic incentives and the ability to
raise matching funds." States received money if they developed plans
in accordance with federal guidelines and facilities received money if they
built according to the plans' determination of need.' While federal regula-
S. REP. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
Hospital Construction Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 26, 177.
2 Id. at 177.
See Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities
and Pitfalls, 70 NW. U.L. REv. 168 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose, Pitfalls].
See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach,
88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978).
" Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, ch. 958, S 2, 60 Stat. 1041,
1042-44, 1048-49 (1945).
Id. at 1041-42, 1043-46.
K. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC's HEALTH 133 (1976).
SId.
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tions and state plans developed criteria for setting priorities among re-
quests for funds and for allocating monies, no criteria dealt with efficiency
of operations or with monitoring the assurances for meeting the twin
obligations of community service and uncompensated care. 9 From 1947
through 1968, Congress appropriated $3.2 billion for 424,000 in-patient
beds,40 while the uncompensated care and community service provisions
of the program remained in abeyance.
THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT
For almost twenty years the only set of class action suits that in any
way touched on the Hill-Burton Act centered on racial discrimination.4
The courts held that a private hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds was
engaged in state action and was therefore directly subject to the pro-
visions of the fourteenth amendment.42 These hospitals could not refuse
emergency care or hospital admission nor deny appointment to the medical
staff on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin.
4 3
The enforcement of these judicial decisions and compliance with the
1964 Civil Rights Act with respect to health care rested in the Office
of the General Counsel of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW).4 The Acting Chief of the Health Civil Rights Branch from
1966 to 1968 was Marilyn G. Rose, a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law
School with previous experience in the field of national labor relations.45
In the course of her work, she discovered the community service and un-
compensated care obligations under the Hill-Burton Act and wrote an in-
ternal memoramdum outlining the potential use of these obligations in
the area of access to health care for minorities and the poor." The war
on poverty was in full swing at the time, with the problems relating to
health care and poverty assumed to have been solved by the passage
" W. SHONICK, ELEMENTS OF PLANNING FOR AREA-WIDE PERSONAL HEALTH SERVICE 39
(1976).
40 Rose, Hospital Admission of the Poor and the Hill-Burton Act, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
185, 191 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rose, Hospital Admission]. Of the 424,000 in-patient
beds, an estimated 312,000 were in general hospitals. Id.
4' See Flagler Hosp., Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d 950, 950 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Eaton
v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 1964).
42 E.g., Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
"' E.g., Flagler Hosp., Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d at 950; Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d at 715.
" Telephone interviews with Marilyn G. Rose, Attorney for plaintiffs in the following
cases: Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970), 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D.
La. 1972); Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon,
506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974); and Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1977) (April
15, 17, 21, 1981).
45 Id.
46 Id.
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of Medicare and Medicaid." Thus, Rose received no response to her
memorandum and HEW failed to follow up on it.48
In 1968 Rose transferred to the Department of Labor, but remained
in the Washington, D.C., area, where she became involved in the
Washington tenant rent strike. 9 She met a number of legal service lawyers
including the newly appointed director of the National Legal Program
on Health Problems of the Poor (currently the National Health Law Pro-
gram (Nhelp) of the Legal Services Corporation), who asked her to join
the program in Los Angeles and pursue her intersts in access to health
care for the medically indigent and poor.'
Nhelp was originally part of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
with a research and training center in Philadelphia and a backup-support
center in Los Angeles." The backup-support center served as an infor-
mational clearing house for legal developments and cases in the area of
health and poverty and provided legal assistance and counsel to OEO
Neighborhood Legal Services programs around the country. 2 In addition,
the backup-support center engaged in research, drafting model legisla-
tion, monitoring administrative agency rulemaking, and participating in
court litigation and test cases, mostly on the appellate level.-
Rose joined Nhelp in October 1969"4 and within five months published
two articles in which she set forth the premise and supporting arguments
that a hospital constructed, modernized, or expanded under the Hill-Burton
program had statutory, contractual, and constitutional obligations not to
deny services to persons otherwise self-supporting who cannot afford to
pay for such services. 5 Such hospitals should not be permitted to fulfill
their uncompensated care obligations by rendering services to Medicare
or Medicaid patients because the provisions of the Act were specifically
aimed at covering medically indigent persons unable to pay. 8 Denial of
service to this class was an actionable wrong.57
In her articles, Rose argued that such cases could be brought as class
actions in the federal courts. On the question of standing, the procedural
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
5 Id.
" See generally Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, supra note 16.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Telephone interviews with Marilyn G. Rose, supra note 44.
5Id.
' Rose defined "medically indigent persons" as those "who are not covered by health
insurance or are ineligible for coverage by the existing welfare or medicaid plan and can-
not meet the required deposit or pay the hospital bills out of their income." Rose, Hospital
Admission, supra note 40, at 185.
" See id.; Rose, The Duty of Publicly-Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medical-
ly Indigent, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rose, Medically Indigent].
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issue of who can sue, Roses suggested that the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare has the inherent power to seek
judicial enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Hill-Burton grants
and loans. Such legal action is unlikely because HEW, in observance of
the federal system, is reluctant to interfere in the operations of a state
agency under a federal-state grant-in-aid program. Furthermore, HEW
apparently acquiesced to the claims of the hospitals that their obligation
could be met through the provision of services to Medicare and Medicaid
patients because these payments did not meet the full cost of providing
care.
5 9
Rose contended that when the separation and delegation of powers be-
tween the federal and state agencies fails to insure provision of services
to a class of beneficiaries, in this case the poor and medically indigent,
people within the class the legislation is designed to protect or benefit
can sue for the enforcement of the obligations even though the statute
does not confer such standing explicitly. She argued that, intended or
not, the Act clearly contained a contractually binding requirement for
receipt of grant funds, and that the free care provision had been added
by the very Senators who realized the bill lacked funds to support and
maintain hospitals in needy communities.
Rose ended her 1969 article with the following statement: "The National
Legal Program on Health Care for the Poor is interested in assisting Legal
Services projects representing their clients who have been denied admis-
sion to hospitals because of inability to pay."" She then undertook a survey
to discover the nature and extent of the problem and visited various areas
of the country to see where the issue was ripe for litigation.2 Out of this
activity and contacts from other attorneys with potential test cases,
Marilyn G. Rose was to become an attorney of record in Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hospital,' Lugo v. Simon,64 Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization v. Simon," and Euresti v. Stenner.6 In these and other suits
the courts began a process to define and allocate potential benefits to
the poor and medically indigent under the Hill-Burton Act.
The following sections of the article examine several Hill-Burton class
action suits. The sections present the background facts, discuss the nature
See generally Rose, Medically Indigent, supra note 57.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Rose, Hospital Admission, supra note 40, at 193.
Telephone interviews with Marilyn G. Rose, supra note 44.
319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss denied) (Cook
I), 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted) (Cook
II), al.'d, 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977) (Cook III).
' 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I).
" Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (Eastern
Kentucky I, rer'd, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Eastern Kentucky II), vacated & remanded, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Eastern Kentucky III).
458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1977).
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of the class, analyze the major legal points, and explain the social impact
of the cases.
THE HILL-BURTON LAWSUITS
The Leading Case: Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital
The first and leading class action suit addressing enforcement of obliga-
tions under the Hill-Burton Act is Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital."7
Eight individual plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana claiming that ten New Orleans
hospitals "were ignoring their commitments . . . to the Louisiana Hill-
Burton Agency with respect to assurances made in their grant applica-
tions" for the provision of "a reasonable volume" of services to the poor,
either through providing free care or care at below-cost charges.68
The ten hospitals claimed the plaintiffs lacked standing under the Act,
arguing that the claims and demands for uncompensated care should not
be recognized or even considered by the court because the plaintiffs did
not constitute a class able to enforce the provisions of the Act through
adjudication. 9 The court agreed that the Act did not give the plaintiffs
express authority to bring the private action. In order for the plaintiffs
to institute a private action, the court said, they would have to be regarded
as third party beneficiaries of a contract under the Act." The court then
went on to define the only real beneficiaries of a hospital program such
as Hill-Burton as those people who need or may need medical treatment.
The court agreed to hear a class action suit even though no section of
the law expressly authorized it.71 By obtaining standing in court, legal
services attorneys achieved the first step facing a law reform movement
under conditions of potentially distributed benefits but potentially con-
centrated costs. But recognition of the legitimacy of the complaint only
permitted the possibility of a short-circuit outcome of correcting a flaw
in normative regulations governing hospitals. It took another two years
for a decision on the merits of the case.
Of all the classes in suits discussed in this article, the plaintiffs in Cook
more truly constituted a social as well as a legal class. Most of the women
who brought the suit knew each other through neighborhood groups and
a tenants' association.'2 The New Orleans Volunteers in Service to America
" 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970), 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972), affjd, 559 F.2d 968
(5th Cir. 1977) (Cook I, Cook II, and Cook III, respectively).
"' Rose, Pitfalls, supra note 33, at 172. See also Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D.
at 356 n.1 (Cook II).
" See Cook v. Ochnser Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (Cook I).
, See id.
" See id.
I Telephone interview with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, Attorney for plaintiffs in Cook v. Ochnser
Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (Cook II) (April 30, 1981).
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(VISTA) and OEO neighborhood programs had been working with these
women for some time and were in the process of bringing lawsuits con-
cerning housing when Jeffery B. Schwartz, an attorney with the New
Orleans Legal Services Program, noticed that two women consistently
missed appointments and meetings. ' He soon discovered that the women
were late or absent because, when they took their children for medical
attention, they ended up spending most of a day going from one hospital
emergency or out-patient clinic to another in search of care. 4 Over time,
access to health care slowly became a recognizable problem in an agency
primarily concerned with better housing and tenants' rights. 5
Schwartz, however, had no experience litigating health issues, and this,
coupled with the emerging problem, motivated him to attend a conference
in Chicago sponsored by the National Health Law Program in the spring
of 1970. ' There he met Marilyn G. Rose, who was leading a series of
training sessions to help public interest lawyers recognize a range of
health-related issues and identify legal solutions to specific problems."
Schwartz returned to New Orleans with a new set of ideas and began
thinking about some legal strategies in the area of access to health care. 8
Rose returned to Los Angeles aware of a potential test case ripe for
litigation." Thus, the loosely linked social network of public interest
lawyers and health advocates centered around the National Health Law
Program would follow and support the case."
Shortly after Schwartz' return, the State of Louisiana initiated budget
cuts that affected service at the New Orleans Charity Hospital, a major
institution serving the black community and the inner city poor.8' The
curtailment of services at Charity Hospital created demands for service
at other New Orleans hospitals, including several that were traditionally
closed to blacks.82 Since these hospitals had received Hill-Burton funds,83
it was reasonably easy to identify individuals who had been denied ser-
vices based on their inability to pay and to initiate a class action suit
to force fulfillment of the community service and uncompensated care
obligations.
The lawyers' immediate objective was to-get the ten hospitals to pro-
73Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
17 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
Telephone interview with Armin Freifeld, Staff attorney for the National Health Law
Program (Nhelp) (March 31, 1981); telephone interview with Ruth Galanter, Editor of the
Nhelp Newsletter (April 24, 1981).
" Telephone interview with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, supra note 72.
82 Id.
3 Id.; see also Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 362 (Cook II).
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vide free services to the medically indigent and poor.84 In order to
accomplish this, the attorneys had to address the problem created by the
negligence of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the
Louisiana Hill-Burton Agency.85 These agencies had not carried out their
duty to ensure that hospitals met their obligations under the program. 6
They had failed to issue any rules, regulations, or standards or to take
other specific action with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiffs.'
In 1972 Judge Comiskey held in Cook that the Secretary of HEW had
violated his legal obligations to enforce the Hill-Burton Act, its regula-
tions, and the assurances given by hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds.88
One course of action in such a situation is for the court to issue a writ
of mandamus ordering the Secretary to write the regulations, promulgate
them, and enforce them. But courts seem to prefer alternatives other than
ordering a member of the executive branch to take a positive action. In-
stead of directly confronting HEW or the State of Louisiana, Judge
Comiskey ordered the hospitals to develop their own set of rules cover-
ing the free care and community service obligations, subject to review
by the court and all litigating parties.89
Under the negotiated agreements, the hospitals were to provide free
and below-cost services to persons unable to pay, make prior determina-
tion of eligibility for services to persons unable to pay, and increase their
participation in the Medicaid program.' The hospitals could count any
losses in accepting Medicaid beneficiaries toward the dollar amount of
care prescribed in the agreement, although the plaintiffs reserved the
right to challenge the losses and to contend that properly administered
Medicaid programs should incur no losses Judge Comiskey gave the
agreement the status of a court order to be fulfilled within one year, but
said it could be superseded and supplanted by final regulations issued
by HEW. 2 Ten days before the interim court settlement was published
and approximately ninety days before the final court order was to take
effect, HEW issued a temporary regulation in the Federal Register.3
By creating a new normative system applicable only to ten hospitals
in New Orleans, Judge Comiskey was able to short circuit the outcome,
Telephone interview with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, supra note 72.
Id.; see generally Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 361-66 (Cook II).
Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 361-66 (Cook II); see also telephone inter-
view with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, supra note 72.
" Telephone interview with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, supra note 72; see also Cook v. Ochsner
Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 364 (Cook II).
88 Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 361 (Cook II).
Id. at 356-57 n.1.
Id. at 356 n.1.
91 Id.
12 Id. at 356-57 n.1.
' 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (1972) (codified in 42 C.F.R. S 53.111 (1972)), as amended by 38
Fed. Reg. 16,353-54 (1973) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (1973)).
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move a lethargic bureaucracy into action, and indirectly force the
Secretary to promulgate a national set of normative rules governing the
twin Hill-Burton obligations. In retrospect, Cook resulted in the issuance
of long-overdue regulations without the overt conflict and collective
behavior that sociological theory might suggest. 4 The subsequent class
action suits caused significiant change, including some congressional ac-
tion, which is the essence of a successful short circuit.
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center9 5
The interim regulations, issued on July 22, 1972, and finalized on March
13, 1973,9 permitted hospitals a choice in meeting their free care obliga-
tions under the Hill-Burton Act. A facility was allowed to certify it would
turn away no one who sought free care (commonly called the "open door
policy") or was assumed to be in presumptive compliance if it provided
uncompensated care in the amount not less than three percent of its
operating costs (less costs attributable to Medicaid and Medicare) or ten
percent of all federal assistance received by the hospital, whichever was
the lesser. 7 The maximum time for a hospital to provide uncompensated
care under a Hill-Burton contract was twenty years from the opening
of the facility or portion thereof receiving the grant." The regulations
also contained standards regarding income eligibility criteria and billing
procedures for persons unable to pay.99
The new regulations proved to be a legal lightning rod for some long
standing grievances. In 1961 Beth Israel Medical Center, a large facility
(373 beds) located on the lower east side of Manhattan, agreed to operate
a neighborhood health clinic out of the old Gouverneur Hospital while
a new hospital was constructed.00 During the early stages of construc-
tion the city altered its plans and decided to build a chronic care facility
instead.' This particular part of the city was predominantly Puerto Rican
and black with some Chinese and an elderly Russian Jewish and Polish
Catholic population. 2 It was probably one of the most organized com-
munities in the country with a maze of ethnic clubs, political organiza-
tions, and special interest groups.' Those who opposed the change in
plans organized the Lower East Side Neighborhood Association, which
See generally A. MAUSS, supra note 15; N. SMELSER, supra note 13.
g 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Corum II).
See note 93 supra.
42 C.F.R. S 53.111(b)(4), (d) (1973).
" See note 93 supra.
9 Id.
109 B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE 270 (1970).
o Id. at 270-72.
,o, Id. at 269-70.
103 See generally id. at 268-79.
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collected 10,000 signatures on a petition demanding that the original
neighborhood health-general care facility be built.' In 1967 the city agreed
to construct a facility with 120 general care and 85 chronic care beds
but no maternity or surgical services."
The Lower East Side Neighborhood Association monitored the
developments at Beth Israel, and when the hospital applied for OEO funds
for the neighborhood clinic, the Association's Health Council became the
clinic's community advisory board."°6 Unfortunately, the Health Council's
advice and suggestions were generally ignored by the hospital's
administration. ' This frustrating situation led the Health Council to team
up in 1969 with a few dissidents from the Beth Israel local of the Drug
and Hospital Worker's Union to form a more activist coalition of
neighborhood people and employees." 8 The collaborative effort produced
a series of confrontations and demonstrations at the hospital.' 9 Several
people were arrested, the dissident workers fired, and the Association's
Health Council informed that it would no longer be recognized as the
health clinic's community advisory board."
Until July 1, 1971, Beth Israel accepted all patients who applied for
treatment at the clinic and charged for its services according to a citywide
sliding fee schedule.' The sliding fee schedule was possible because other
federal subsidies were available to defray expenses."2 However, these
funds dwindled during the early years of the Nixon administration"' and
Beth Israel responded by increasing charges. After July 1, Beth Israel
accepted only those who. could pay fourty-five dollars per visit or were
eligible for Medicaid or Medicare."' Faced with higher prices, patients
began complaining to various neighborhood associations and social welfare
organizations." 5
In search of assistance, Judy Wessler, a health advocate, approached
the legal services section of Mobilization for Youth, where she met Louise
Lander, a recent law school graduate who had been at the National Health
Law Program training center at the University of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia."6 Although Lander's main interest was poverty law, she was
,' Id. at 271-72.
,' Id. at 271.
, ' Id. at 272.
"., Id. at 272-73.
"' Id. at 275-76.
'" Id. at 276-77.
"' Id. at 277-79.
" Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Corum I).
Telephone interview with Judith Wessler, Advocate for plaintiffs in the following cases:
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Corum I); Corum
v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Corum II) (May 17, 1981).113 Id-
1" I&
I' Id-
"' Id.; Telephone interview with Louise Lander, Attorney for plaintiffs in the following
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willing to help and was able to devise a legal theory attacking the Hill-
Burton regulations."7 Meanwhile Wessler searched the neighborhoods for
individuals who had been denied clinic services solely because of their
inability to pay and who were willing to bring suit. Through her contacts
with the community organizations she found Jeanette Corum and one other
person.1 8 Lander convinced the Lower East Side Neighborhood Associa-
tion, which had been struggling against Beth Israel for almost ten years,
and the Lower East Side Coalition for Humane Housing to lend their
names and become corporate plaintiffs along with the two individual
plaintiffs. 9 In contrast to Cook in which the plaintiffs were all individuals
who knew each other and who had been working with the lawyers on
other poverty-related problems, 20 the "class" in Corum consisted of two
individuals who were sought out by a health advocate and a lawyer, and
two neighborhood associations which claimed to represent the "class,"
but apparently did not have members who actually had legal "status"
within that "class.' 2 1
While the immediate objective in Corum was to get Beth Israel to lower
its costs and to provide free care, the main legal struggle focused on the
new regulations and whether Beth Israel's actions were illegal under them.
The regulations allowed a hospital to postpone the determination of an
individual's eligibility for free care until after the services had been
rendered, and in fact, until after the bill had been sent. This permitted
hospitals to continue what was apparently an established practice of
classifying uncollectable debts as charity, and then claiming this amount
towards their Hill-Burton obligations. As a corollary, it permitted medical-
ly indigent and poor people to obtain services at the cost of being dunned
for a period of time until the books were cleared and the debt reclassified
as charity. This charade was somewhat beneficial to both the hospitals
and the patients, but made it difficult to find individuals who had been
truly denied service.
In Corum Judge Lasker sympathized with the hospital's wish to count
uncollectable debts towards its Hill-Burton obligations, but said that a
difference existed between persons unable to pay and persons unwilling
to pay. 2  The former have a genuine inability to pay and are the true
beneficiaries of charity obligations, while the latter merely refuse to pay
cases: Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Corum I);
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Corum II) (April
17, 1981).
"' Telephone interview with Judith Wessler, supra note 112.
I18 Id.
Id.; Telephone interview with Louise Lander, supra note 116.
12 Telephone interview with Jeffrey B. Schwartz, supra note 72 & accompanying text.
121 Telephone interview with Judith Wessler, supra note 112; telephone interview with
Louise Lander, supra note 116.
" Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. at 557 (Corum II).
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for a variety of reasons. Judge Lasker decided that the best way to
separate the two groups was to determine eligibility prior to rendering
services."
As a class action suit, Corum did not win more benefits for the people
of the Lower East Side. It did, however, alter the practices Beth Israel
used to determine eligibility, and possibly defused a situation that could
have led to a resumption of the demonstrations and marches that had
occurred a few years earlier. The impact of the case was most evident
at the national level. Soon after Judge Lasker's ruling on prior deter-
mination of eligibility, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
incorporated the decision into the new Hill-Burton regulations.124 An ad-
ministrative agency adopted a judicial decision believing that such rules
were not likely to be challenged successfully in the courts which drafted
them.
Judge Lasker, however, dismissed plaintiff's claims that the HEW for-
mula used to calculate the hospital's uncompensated care obligation was
arbitrary and unfair. He noted that Beth Israel had a very small grant
compared with the total volume of charity care it provided. '25 He also
upheld the twenty-year limit on providing uncompensated care although
the Act did not specify the duration of obligations to provide uncompen-
sated care and community service. The only limitation in the Act involved
a twenty-year period for loan repayment and a twenty-year recovery
period for the government should the hospital close or otherwise default.'26
Judge Lasker wrote that in the absence of a congressional determination
of the duration of obligations, the presumptive compliance guidelines com-
bined with the twenty-year term of uncompensated care produced a
reasonable result given the size of the grant."'
Congress disagreed with the thrust of Judge Lasker's interpretation
of the twenty-year limit. In the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974,128 Congress decided that any new uncompen-
sated care and community service obligations would be indefinite. Con-
gress, of course, could not make the law retroactive. Subsequent court
decisions"s have upheld the original twenty-year limit for uncompensated
care but have extended indefinitely the community service obligations.
The former had a potential economic impact on hospitals, while the latter
' Id. at 557-58.
,24 See note 130 infra.
" Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. at 556 (Corum II).
Id. at 556-57.
127 Id. at 556.
12 42 U.S.C. § 300o-300t-14 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), as amended by the Health Planning
and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 55 127(e), 201-204,
301, 93 Stat. 592, 629-40 (1979), as amended by The Department of Education Organization
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979).
"2 Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1977) (Cook III); Lugo v.
Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28, 35 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I).
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had almost none. Currently, facilities funded before 1975 have a twenty-
year limit on free care and an indefinite obligation under community ser-
vice, while those funded under the 1974 amendments have indefinite
obligations under both.3
The Corum decision influenced the development of normative rules in
both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
Testifying before congressional committees and administrative hearings,
witnesses criticized HEW and the state agencies' failure to enforce regula-
tions since 1972.11 The short-circuiting process, however, removed the
plaintiffs and the social movement from much of the action and placed
the mantle of leadership on the shoulders of lawyers, judges, and legal
experts, who can legitimately change the norms, rules, and laws.,3 2 While
this may remove the strains giving rise to ambiguity in social systems
and short circuit more active forms of collective behavior, the personal
satisfactions and benefits to the individuals who initially brought the suit
must be somewhat diminished.
Lugo v. Simon and Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization v. Simon
Just as Congress was putting the finishing touches on the 1974 amend-
ments, a class action suit, Lugo v. Simon,33 was filed in northern Ohio
on behalf of several migrant laborers with a variety of complaints against
area hospitals. Some of the migrants had been denied hospital services
because they were unable to pay a fourty-five dollar deposit, while others
received services but were later billed although the hospitals knew they
were unable to pay.' Over a brief period of time each of the plaintiffs
approached an attorney about their problem, and soon the lunchtime
conversations among lawyers in and around Bowling Green, Ohio, began
centering on the sudden boom in migrant-versus-hospital cases. One local
attorney, Marvin Feingold of the Ohio Migrant Legal Action Program,
contacted John P. Worcester, his backup resource person in Toledo, and
they decided to consolidate the complaints into one class action suit.3
The plaintiffs in Lugo shared a common market experience with the
hospitals and were part of an economic class but not a social class.' 3' In
'3 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,375-82 (1979) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.501-.607 (1979)).
,3, Note, The Hill-Burton Act. 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to
the Poor, 39 MD. L. REv. 316, 345 (1979).
132 See generally N. SMELSER, supra note 13, at 307-08.
133 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I).
134 Id.
" Telephone interview with John Worcester, Attorney for plaintiffs in the following
cases: Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I); Lugo v. Simon, 453 F.
Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Lugo II) (April 14, 1981).
"' For discussions of distributions of economic power within a class situation determin-
ed by market structure, and of economic classes, see M. WEBER, supra note 10, at 926-28.
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fact, the individual plaintiffs did not know each other beforehand and met
for the first and only time at the initial court hearing. '37
Worcester's brief presented a two-pronged attack. The first challeng-
ed the federal tax-exempt status of the hospitals following Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v, Simon."' This particular strategy
named the Secretary of the Treasury as the first defendant in a case
that would eventually focus on the actions of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. 39 Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
(EKWRO) was a grass roots group chartered in November 1969 at
Teaberry in Floyd County, Kentucky, with the help of some VISTA
volunteers.40 One of its purposes was to improve the health of the region."'
Such an organized effort was needed because the local physicians and
hospitals were hostile and exploitive towards the poor.' Maxine Kenny,
an organizer with previous experience at Health-PAC in New York, and
other VISTA volunteers soon discovered the local custom of going "to
law" someone, that is, to file a lawsuit over the slightest provocation.'
This strategy was used initially by the organizers to build EKWRO and
their first success was to get the local OEO health program defunded.'4
When one woman suffered severe complications in childbirth after she
was denied admission to a local hospital, the membership of EKWRO
wanted "to law" the hospital. 4 The organizers and VISTA lawyers
counseled against such a suit, but the membership prevailed.146
The plaintiffs sought free care by challenging a 1969 Internal Revenue
Service rule eliminating a provision requiring a hospital to provide ser-
vice to those unable to pay in order to qualify as a tax-exempt charitable
institution. The district court granted standing and disagreed with the
IRS action.'47 If upheld, this would have concentrated the burden of pro-
viding charitable care on those hospitals wishing to retain their federal
tax exempt status while forcing the IRS to collect taxes from those
hospitals not providing free care to persons unable to pay. The IRS ap-
Telephone interview with John Worcester, supra note 135.
' Eastern Ky. Welfare Right Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (Eastern
Kentucky I), rev'd, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Eastern Kentucky II), vacated & remanded, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Eastern Kentucky III).
"' See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (Eastern
Kentucky I).
" Telephone interview with Maxine Kenny, Organizer for plaintiffs in Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (Eastern Kentucky I) (April 30, 1981).
"' Articles of Incorporation of Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, Inc., art.
II, Floyd County, Kentucky, Identification no. 15,201 (filed and recorded Nov. 12, 1969)
(copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
"I Telephone interview with Maxine Kenny, supra note 140.
13 1d.
144 Id.
I' Id.
', Id.
, 370 F. Supp. 325 (Eastern Kentucky I).
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pealed and at this point the case came to the attention of Marilyn G.
Rose, then with the National Health Law Program in Los Angeles."8 The
court of appeals, however, reversed the lower court decision, finding
the IRS rule consistent with the intent of Congress and a permissible
definition of charitable.' Two years later the Supreme Court decided
that EKWRO could not establish standing simply because its purposes
included the improvement of health care when it could not demonstrate
any injury to the organization itself nor had the individuals named as
plaintiffs been denied service.10 Therefore EKWRO had no claim against
the hospitals or the IRS. Without standing, the case died. 5'
In this instance, the class action suit might be considered to be the
expected form of collective behavior given the practices of the people
of eastern Kentucky and the strategies of the organizers. The case appears
to have developed from the outside inward, overcoming the objections
of the organizers and attracting the attention of the sociometric star of
the health litigation network, Marilyn G. Rose. But the case was ultimately
unsuccessful, perhaps because the sense of direct collective behavior and
accompanying enthusiasm overrode the more measured and less emotional
approaches found in the other health-oriented class action suits.'52
After the court of appeals' decision in Eastern Kentucky, Rose was asked
to handle the tax and standing aspects of Lugo v. Simon.53 Eventually
the tax aspect was dropped because EKWRO was unsuccessful and the
amended complaint focused on the respective roles of the Ohio Depart-
ment of Health and the federal Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. This prong of the case followed the lines of argument in the
Cook and Corum cases. Judge Young was able to uphold recently pub-
lished decisions in Corum on the same issues. The remaining problem
focused on the failure of the Ohio Department of Health and the Secretary
of HEW to enforce the Hill-Burton obligations through promulgated
regulations.
Following the 1972 Cook decision, HEW produced various sets of
regulations."M Concerns had surfaced regarding their enforcement and in
1974 the Senate noted the sorry performance of prior enforcement ef-
Telephone interview with Marilyn G. Rose, supra note 44.
149 Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Eastern
Kentucky II.
" Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Eastern Kentucky HI).
151 Id.
1"2 See, e.g., Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I); Cook v. Ochsner
Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (Cook I), 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (Cook
II), aff'd, 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977) (Cook III).
11 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I); Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio
1978) (Lugo II).
" 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766-68 (1974) (codified in 42 C.F.R. SS 53.1, 53.112-.113 (1974)); see also
note 93 supra.
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forts by the Secretary and HEW.' In response, Congress wanted to
establish a permanent office to review complaints against individual
hospitals and state Hill-Burton agencies, but this language was dropped
from the bill.156 The issues at law in Lugo, then, were whether the en-
forcement of a shared federal-state program should be centralized in the
federal agency, whether that agency would actually enforce the provi-
sion of the Act, and what role the court should play in upholding its
provisions.'-"
Judge Young agreed with the plaintiffs that the Ohio Department of
Health could not determine its own compliance with the Hill-Burton
provisions' but later found that the plaintiffs had not exhausted all their
administrative remedies. 5 ' He therefore directed them to submit their
complaints to the Secretary of HEW.65 The claim that the Secretary fail-
ed to fulfill his mandatory duty to issue regulations, however, could be
tried because Congress had strongly suggested that a complaint procedure
alone is insufficient to secure compliance.' The immediate effect of this
decision was to turn the state and federal agencies against each other.
Both filed accusatory cross-claims, the state asserting it no longer had
the authority to enforce Hill-Burton provisions in the absence of HEW
regulations and instructions, and HEW arguing that the Ohio Department
of Health had submitted a compliance plan for hospitals that was vague
and confusing and therefore unenforceable.16" ' The court supported HEW's
argument and ordered Ohio to modify its plan and implement and enforce
both the plan and the federal regulations.63
Plaintiff's case against the Secretary and HEW for failure to issue
regulations withstood the defendant's motions to dismiss.' In a consent
decree, HEW then agreed to hold public hearings on proposed regula-
tions, to mail copies of such proposed regulations to the public interest
health community (including a list of some 900 names supplied by Marilyn
G. Rose), to promulgate the final regulations by a given date, and to under-
take compliance surveys on both Hill-Burton and civil rights aspects of
the case. 65 Lugo brought the Hill-Burton rulemaking process into com-
".' S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7842, 7842.
"' H. CONF. REP. No. 1640, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7971, 7997. See also Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. at 685 (Lugo II).
,"7 426 F. Supp. at 31-32 (Lugo I).
255 Id. at 32.
' 453 F. Supp. at 684 (Lugo II).
15 Id. at 685.
"' Id. at 685-86.
252 Id. at 682.
' Id at 691-92.
15 Id. at 691.
255 Telephone interviews with Marilyn G. Rose, supra note 44; Lugo v. Simon, No. 74-345
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 1978) (Lugo III).
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pliance with the already existing Administrative Procedure Act (APA),65
which, somehow, it had previously circumvented. In addition, it led to
the issuance of revised Hill-Burton regulations in 1979.67
The plaintiffs' primary objective throughout the case was a legal-judicial
settlement of claims against them. But the potential benefits were essen-
tially lost in the maze of bureaucratic procedures and rules which were
the direct outcome of the case. The decision short circuited several possible
conflicts between the judiciary and the executive branch and between
the state and federal agencies. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a set
of actions that would force the Ohio Department of Health to follow federal
guidelines or would force HEW to adhere to the Administrative Procedure
Act or to issue mandated regulations without a judicial decree. In this
respect, Lugo is similar to Cook, where a court consent agreement avoided
a long and expensive trial. Hence, a short circuit occurred within the
judicial system as well as among different branches of government.
Newsom v. Vanderbilt University Hospital
The last case to be discussed, Newsom v. Vanderbilt University
Hospital,168 was filed shortly after the National Health Planning Act 69
became law. Callie Mae Newsom had been hospitalized in 1971 at Vander-
bilt University Hospital with a complicated pregnancy and overstayed
her Medicaid coverage.17 The hospital never told her about her potential
Hill-Burton eligibility. 7' When she defaulted on the note, the hospital
sued. ' Upon returning to work she was dunned by a collection agency
until she signed an agreement garnishing a portion of her wages to pay
the hospital debts." She approached Gordon Bonnyman of Legal Services
of Nashville after being served with a trial date.'74
Bonnyman first attempted to negotiate with hospital attorneys for an
out-of-court settlement but received no response to his inquiries.' He
then decided to file a class action suit, thereby allowing the courts to
5 U.S.C. § 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). In
1971 HEW voluntarily began promulgating all Department regulations under APA pro-
cedures and publishing them in proposed and final form in the Federal Register. See 36
Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971).
167 See note 130 supra.
168 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (Newsom I), No. 75-126, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. Sept.
20, 1979) (Newsom II), affd in part, rev'd in part, modified in part, 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.
1981) (Newsom III).
169 See note 128 supra.
"' Telephone interview with Gordon Bonnyman, Attorney for plaintiffs, Newsom v.
Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (Newsom I) (April 10, 1981).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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consider the future need of Newsom and other class members to un-
compensated care beyond the eventual resolution of Newsom's past
hospital bills."' In addition, Newsom, as one member of the class, could
exhaust administrative remedies on behalf of the whole class and bring
the case to trial on its merits. " This reasoning and set of procedures
permits an attorney to transform an individual plaintiff's private trouble
into a class action suit addressing major social problems and legal issues.
It also tends to distribute potential benefits among members of the class
and to concentrate costs on those who willingly or unwillingly must pro-
vide the benefits.
Bonnyman began by tapping into the health law network. He contacted
John Worcester and received an early draft of the Lugo brief which he
then incorporated into his own brief."8 When Worcester later was search-
ing for more information and ideas, he received Bonnyman's brief through
the health law network.7 9 Marilyn G. Rose was busy at the time with
the tax exemption aspects of both Eastern Kentucky and Lugo, but her
presence was felt. Judge Morton would cite an article that summarized
and commented on the Cook, Corum, and Eastern Kentucky cases"1 0 and
an article on the Hill-Burton obligations of nonprofit hospitals written
by Rose with Jeffrey Schwartz, who worked on the Cook case.'
Many of the issues in Newsom were similar to those in previous cases.
In Corum Judge Lasker had recommended that hospitals make a written
determination of eligibility to pay before rendering service, and this had
been incorporated into the HEW regulations. 8' Some hospitals, however,
viewed this solely as an internal bookkeeping procedure. Although pro-
spective patients were routinely interviewed concerning their ability to
pay, Vanderbilt University Hospital did not inform them of their poten-
tial eligibility or of the criteria and standards used by the, hospital to
categorize admissions under the Hill-Burton provisions.' According to
Bonnyman, the court received as evidence internal hospital memorandums
indicating that only acute terminal cases would be admitted as uncompen-
sated care patients and that the hospital had instituted a monitoring
mechanism for this policy because some of the house staff were trying
to admit people in spite of the hospital directives."
In his decision, Judge Morton determined that the provision of a
175 Id.
177 653 F.2d at 1106 (Newsom III).
1 Telephone interview with Gordon Bonnyman, supra note 170.
170 Telephone interview with John Worcester, supra note 135.
11 453 F. Supp. at 404 n.1, 409 (Newsom I) (citing Rose, Pitfalls, supra note 33).
1 453 F. Supp. at 410 (Newsom I) (citing Schwartz & Rose, Opening the Doors of the
Non-Profit Hospital to the Poor, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 655 (1974)).
' 40 Fed. Reg. 46,202-03 (1975) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (1976)).
11 453 F. Supp. at 416 (Newsom I).
,I Telephone interview with Gordon Bonnyman, supra note 170.
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reasonable volume of free care to the indigent was required by the Hill-
Burton Act and constituted state action-that is, action that is under col-
or of state law and is not voluntary on the part of the participating
hospitals.' Therefore, the court held the fifth amendment due process
clause could be applied through the fourteenth amendment. The court
ruled that hospitals may deny medical care to indigent people only if they
give meaningful notice of eligibility criteria, written reasons for a denial
of services, and an opportunity to appeal to an administrator who did
not participate in the initial denial and who must render a written deci-
sion with reasons. 1
86
The plaintiffs also asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus to
remedy the failure of the state and federal agencies to properly regulate,
monitor, and enforce the free care provisions and eligibility procedures
of the Act.18 7 Judge Morton noted the court would have issued such a
mandate "[h]ad the Secretary taken no steps toward complying with the
mandate" of the statute, but pursuant to court orders, an affidavit had
been filed on behalf of the Secretary stating that the proposed regula-
tions would be promulgated shortly.88
This threat of mandamus, coupled with the Lugo consent agreement
two months earlier, spurred HEW to issue new and updated regulations
within a year. 89 The incorporation of judicial recommendations and opi-
nions in the Hill-Burton regulations paralleled HEW actions following the
Cook and Corum decisions. But the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed that portion of the lower court's opinion and judgment requir-
ing the adoption of due process procedures. The appeals court found that
the "District Court's determination of a due process right cannot rest
upon something promulgated after the court made its decision," even if
the new regulations were more equitable and beneficial. 10 The Secretary
of HEW was free, of course, to amend the regulations, but was not re-
quired to do so.'
The court of appeals reasoned that other, suits9 ' involved the govern-
ment's taking away of a benefit which had previously been enjoyed, but
in the present case the regulations affected future benefits to the class.193
It wrote: "[N]o member of the class, merely by being a member of the
class, has any right to free services. Which class members will be benefited
was left solely to the discretion of the hospital as long as a certain amount
" 453 F. Supp. at 422 (Newsom I).
" Id. at 424.
" Id. at 429.
168 Id.
' 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,375-82 (1979) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.501-.607 (1979)).
'9 653 F.2d at 1122 (Newsom III).
191 Id.
192 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
193 653 F.2d at 1123 (Newsom III).
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was provided.' 1 94 This essentially resolved the social problem for the class
as an aggregate, but created private troubles for those members of the
class who would be denied services because the resources and obligations
of any particular hospital are limited.
Another crucial question decided by the district court and upheld with
some modifications by the appeals court was how to assess or measure
a hospital's compliance with the Hill-Burton regulations. HEW had issued
"presumptive compliance guidelines"'95 which essentially meant that an
institution did not have to demonstrate its compliance until challenged
in court. Intentional compliance, on the other hand, implies carrying out
a set of actions with a commitment to meeting the end to be attained.'
Judge Morton wrote that under presumptive compliance standards, "it
is hard to imagine how Vanderbilt could have failed to comply,"'97 then
commented in a footnote that "[i]f intentional compliance had been re-
quired, however, Vanderbilt might well have provided no Hill-Burton free
care at all until recently."'98
While not striking down the presumptive compliance guidelines or re-
quiring intentional compliance in the future, the court held "the obliga-
tion to provide the care is necessarily coupled with a requirement that
the hospital record and report the amount of such care [and] [i]f it failed
to keep the proper records then it must bear the consequences."'99 The
court ordered Vanderbilt to comply with existing reporting requirements,
to document properly its claims of service under the Hill-Burton provi-
sions, to desist certain collection practices against any patients for ser-
vice who would have qualified for uncompensated care but for Vanderbilt's
improper acts, and to provide notice of Hill-Burton eligibility with its
billings."' The order was issued June 1, 1978, but by September 20, 1979,
the court was forced to issue a civil contempt order against Vanderbilt
for noncompliance."' The court specifically ordered Vanderbilt to produce
records and documents to the Hill-Burton agency and the court similar
to information required of hospitals in Cook."'
The Newsom case by itself cannot be considered a social movement or
an example of collective behavior if one considers such a movement or
such behavior to involve a fairly large group of people coming together
to support and participate in some action. Perhaps Newsom represents
the ultimate short circuit, in which one individual's private troubles are
,9 Id. at 1121.
' 453 F. Supp. at 411 n.10 (Newsom I).
I d.
Id. at 411.
,' Id. at 411 n.11.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419, 429-30.
=' No. 75-126, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 1979) (Newsom II).
' See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 356 n.1 (E.D. La. 1972) (Cook II).
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transformed through a class action suit into a social problem, but then
resolved on the societal level by normative changes that create new
private troubles for some individuals in the future. The short circuiting,
however, is not possible in isolation. The existence of the previous cases
contributed to the readiness of attorneys to see the Newsom case as ripe
for litigation as a class action suit and to the willingness of the courts
to grant standing and to hear the case on its merits. The Newsom case
is one short circuit in the health law movement that is part of a set of
larger social forces in the health and social welfare arena.
SOME SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASES
The major premise of this paper is that class action suits provide one
mechanism through which the judicial process can effect social change.
The review of five class action suits related to the Hill-Burton Act sup-
ports this hypothesis. The ultimate outcome of four of the five cases was
the promulgation of new government regulations in accordance with
judicial opinions and interpretations of the law. In addition, at least one
of the cases, Corum, influenced Congress in its deliberations over the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.31 Both
the promulgation of revised sets of regulations and the passage of the
1974 act changed the behavior of state health departments which
administered the Hill-Burton program and of the hospitals which had
accepted Hill-Burton funds.
The Class Action as a Substitute for Social Organization
The beginning of this paper presented three questions"" of concern to
the legal community with respect to the sociology of class action suits.
The article now examines them in light of the cases. The first question
was: Is a class action suit a substitute for social organization?
2 See note 128 supra.
" Another question is whether the social networks and communications among attorneys
constitute a breach of professional ethics. A review of the Hill-Burton class action suits
reveals a number of actions consistently taken by lawyers in developing and prosecuting
their cases. These include discussing potential clients with other attorneys; referring clients
to a single legal service firm; consolidating individual cases into a single class action suit
(Lugo I and II); identifying, while working with a group of clients, a previously overlooked
problem which is actionable (Cook I and II); actively searching for an individual with stand-
ing to serve as a plaintiff (Corum I and II); responding to client and activist pressures
to pursue litigation regardless of the likelihood for success (Eastern Kentucky I and II);
advising a client that the best course of action to avoid garnishment of wages for the removal
of debt is to file a class action suit (Newsom I and II); educating and training attorneys
in the latest legal developments; encouraging them to subscribe to newsletters; and offer-
ing attorneys assistance if they need consultation (Nhelp).
The issue is whether or not a difference exists between seeking out those with claims
or grounds for action and seeking those with standing who can act as representatives of
[Vol. 57:385
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Social organization is both a form and a process. Class action suits as
a form of social organization involve the plaintiffs as a legal class which
can vary in size and social solidarity.0 5 As was the case in Newsom,"6
it is possible for a single individual to become the sole representative
of a legal class. In Eastern Kentucky an organization became the plaintiff
without specifying a particular individual representative.2 °7 In between
these two extremes are Lugo, with several identifiable individuals;"0 Cook,
with eight named plaintiffs;m and Corum, with a combination of two named
individuals and two organizations." '
The social solidarity of the legal class can vary in several ways. The
legal class can be individuals who occupy a common status and lifestyle
and who are acquainted with each other. In Cook the legal class consisted
of neighbors who were linked through a tenants' organization and who
were, in sociological terms, a social group with face-to-face interactions.
The legal class can also be an economic class, sharing the same occupa-
tion and mode of employment. In Lugo the plaintiffs were all migrant
farmers who apparently did not know each other and who met for the
first and only time in court. Finally, a legal class can consist of an organiza-
tion interested in the acquisition of social power, that is, an action group
or party. 1 In Eastern Kentucky the organization pushed ahead without
even specifying a named individual plaintiff, and in Corum, the organiza-
tion, in response to membership pressures and complaints, sought out
plaintiffs who were not members in order to file the suit.
the class. This latter activity appears to be protected by the first amendment because
the lawyers sought to litigate in the public interest and were not paid by their clients.
See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The authors do not attempt a legal analysis of whether
the conduct of lawyers in class action suits complies with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in terms of decisions to file class actions and the duties to represent a client
competently and zealously. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-104(AX5); Canons 6-7 (1981). Carlin, who has done the major work on legal ethics in sociology,
found that "[l]ower-status clients are most likely to provide lawyers with opportunities
for exploitation and to end up with lawyers who are least capable of resisting temptation."
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 177-78 (1966) [hereinafter cited as J. CARLIN, ETHICS]. He noted
that client solicitation was not a matter of great importance to most lawyers and was not
a frequently given reason for discipline by the bar association. Id. at 180. This, plus research
on the nature and conduct of class action suits reported in this article, suggests that the
attorneys involved in the Hill-Burton suits behaved in an expected and typical manner.
From a sociological perspective, class action suits have their own "rules of the game" and
the lawyers appear to have observed these widely understood, if unwritten, rules.
See generally E. DURKHEIM, RULES, supra note 3.
See notes 168-202 & accompanying text sapra.
See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (Eastern
Kentucky I).
11 See Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Lugo I); Lugo v. Simon, 453
F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Lugo II).
I See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (Cook I); Cook
v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (Cook II).
2,' See Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Corum
I); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Corum II).
2,, See generally M. WEBER, supra note 10.
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Class action suits as a process of social organization involve the transfor-
mation of private troubles into social problems. If social organization can
be considered a series of concentric circles with the leadership in the
center and the general public on the outside, then the evolution of social
movements can be categorized into an inside-outward or outside-inward
pattern. The inside-outward pattern begins with a social entrepreneur
possessing a vision or sense of mission."2 The social entrepreneur may
or may not have a private trouble, but perceives that many others do
and attempts to unite them into a social movement that attacks the cause
of their troubles.
Perhaps the most consistent findings concerning the evolution of class
action suits is the crucial role played by attorneys as social entrepreneurs.
One sociologist remarked as an example that an aggrieved party's demands
for a court injunction must be carried out by attorneys,"3 and the history
of the Hill-Burton class action suits strongly suggests that lawyers act
as gatekeepers and mediators in the process. Among the poor and lower
classes are many people who are unaware of their need for the right to
legal services. The emergence of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
legal services and the health law industry was a deliberate attempt to
expand this knowledge and increase access to the judicial system for the
poor. Even the Supreme Court has noted that "[1laymen cannot be ex-
pected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practiced
and carefully counseled adversaries ... ,,24 A distinction, however, should
be made between the role of attorneys in the evolution of the health law
movement, which set the stage for the Hill-Burton class action suits, and
the development or ripening of each case for litigation. The health law
movement had its origins in the convergence of the civil rights move-
ment and the war on poverty. The civil rights movement had often turn-
ed to class action"' and efforts to desegregate hospitals followed this same
strategy."' What was new was the adoption of a litigation strategy for
the war on poverty with the creation of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity's Legal Services, and the subsequent establishment of back-up
centers including one devoted to health law.217 This inner core of health
lawyers was able to determine policy and initiate actions independently
of the social forces that organized or continued to fund them.1 8
212 See generally H. BECKER, supra note 3.
213 N. SMELSER, supra note 13, at 307.
21 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
215 See, e.g., note 14 supra; see also J. HANDLER, supra note 18, at 26-27.
216 See Flagler Hosp., Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Eaton
v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
217 Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, supra note 16, at 45-47.
218 See generally W. GAMSON, supra note 21; J. HANDLER, supra note 18; J. MCCARTHY &
M. ZALD, TREND, supra note 16.
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This organizational matrix facilitated the development of a series of
class action suits concerning obligations of hospitals under the Hill-Burton
Act.2 9 Of the handful of people at the Health Law Backup Center in Los
Angeles, Marilyn G. Rose was the most active. She had conceived the
Hill-Burton class action strategy before the establishment of the Backup
Center and then became one of its first full-time attorneys." Her publica-
tions and training sessions generated awareness of the issues and en-
couraged legal service attorneys across the country to identify situations
that were ripe for litigation and appeal. In addition, the small staff at
Nhelp maintained a newsletter distributed to legal services workers and
clients and provided advice and consultation.22 At the other end of the
country, the Health Law Training Program in Philadelphia produced,
among others, Louise Lander, who developed and argued the Corum
case.
2T2
These activities reflect an inside-outward pattern of developing a social
movement, where lawyers in the health law network reached out to create
the legal class of plaintiffs and to support a series of class action suits.
In Cook a group of people with similar problems were working with
attorneys on another matter and jointly discovered the possibility of a
class action suit. In their search for assistance they were met halfway
by Nhelp and Marilyn G. Rose. In Lugo the complaints of several poten-
tial plaintiffs against different hospitals were consolidated by lawyers in-
to a single class action suit. In Newsom the individual plaintiff came direct-
ly to the attorney. In each of these cases, the individual's private troubles
were transformed by the attorney into a class action suit addressing public
issues and social problems.m The plaintiffs' primary goal was to obtain
access to free or low-cost care, while the lawyers, who were linked into
the health law network, saw these situations as ripe for litigation and
convinced the clients to allow them to organize the case as a class action
suit in an effort to promote social change.
The Corum and Eastern Kentucky cases, however, appear to reflect the
alternative, or outside-inward pattern of developing a social movement.
This pattern begins when a few individuals discover that others like them
are in the same predicament. 4 They organize or band together and seek
remedies to social issues from the larger society.2 s Applied to the evolu-
tion of class action suits, this outside-inward pattern flows from the
219 See notes 67-202 & accompanying text supra.
Telephone interview with Marilyn G. Rose, supra note 44.
ni Telephone interview with Ruth Galanter, supra note 80.
Telephone interview with Louise Lander, supra note 116.
See generally A. MAUSS, supra note 15; C. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959).
22 See generally Blumer, Social Movements, in H. BLUMER, A. HOLLINGSHEAD, E. HUGHES,
N. HUMPHREY, A. LEE & E. REUTER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 199-212 (1951); A. MAUSS, supra
note 15.
See generally Blumer, supra note 224.
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discontented in the general public to organized groups to attorneys who
then select plaintiffs likely to gain standing. The case that most resembles
this model is Corum, in which dissatisfied patients at Beth Israel con-
tacted neighborhood organizations, which then sought out attorneys and
the possibility of bringing suit. In the end the attorney and the health
advocate had to search for a person who would have standing and who
was willing to become a plaintiff.
The Eastern Kentucky case also emerged from a generalized displeasure
with the local health care delivery system. EKWRO, however; had been
organized with the assistance of VISTA volunteers and other activists
who saw litigation as one strategy for organization building and social
action. The failure of the Eastern Kentucky class action suit was perhaps
that once the organization became the plaintiff, no effort was made to
reach out and find an individual with a specific grievance upon which the
case could be built.
The Hill-Burton class action suits created a framework for social change
by channeling activities into the judicial system. The litigation deflected
the aim of the social movement from reorganizing norms to identifying
specific flaws in the normative regulations and correcting them through
the judicial process.2 6 But this channeling short circuits two different
chains of events. The first involves collective behavior in the larger society,
when, for example, public protests are settled in the courtroom rather
than the streets. In Corum Judge Lasker reached a decision that apparent-
ly clarified and defused tense situations at Beth Israel that had previous-
ly led to demonstrations. Since the ultimate outcome of Corum was the
promulgation of new regulations by HEW and the statutory revisions of
the Hill-Burton obligations by Congress, it might be argued that the
specific grievances between the plaintiffs and the Beth Israel Medical
Center were not fully resolved. Nevertheless, the executive and legislative
branches addressed the larger societal issues of health care for the poor
and the medically indigent by initiating substantive changes. The Eastern
Kentucky class action suit, which appears to be a local form of general
collective behavior, may have short circuited more hostile encounters.
The second short-circuited chain of events was the potential showdown
between the judiciary and the two other branches of government.7 Here
a substantive threat either to extend the scope of the litigation or to go
directly to trial stimulated the executive or legislative branch to act. In
Cook the negotiation of a set of regulations between the plaintiffs and
the defendant hospitals, independent of HEW, brought about the swift
promulgation of interim rules. Such independent agreements could have
set a precedent and resulted in many areas of the country having their
own rules, which would either cause a bureaucratic-administrative
22 See generally N. SMELSER, supra note 13.
See generally G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 128, 131, 135 (1981).
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nightmare for HEW or encourage a move towards uniform standards
through additional legislation.
In both Lugo and Newsom, the courts found that the Secretary of HEW
had neglected his duties under the 1974 amendments to the Hill-Burton
Act 8 to promulgate and enforce the regulations. In Lugo the judge sus-
tained the plaintiffs' case against the Secretary and overruled the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss,' while in Newsom the judge was willing to issue
a writ of mandamus." ° Both would have resulted in lengthy court pro-
ceedings that were avoided by affidavits from the Secretary promising
to promulgate rules within a year. Thus, these short circuits within the
judicial system avoided trials and jurisdictional conflicts between the
judicial and executive branches.
In response to the first question, then, class action suits can substitute
for both the form and the process of social organization. A legal class
consisting of members of a social group or an organization interested in
the acquisition of social power adds a process (litigation) to an existing
structure. A legal class consisting of members of an economic class or
a group organized by a social entrepreneur creates a new structure which
substitutes for possible collective behavior. In general, it appears that
when a legal class is an already existing social group or organization the
class action suit is most likely to develop from the outside inward. Yet,
when the lawsuit itself requires constructing a legal class, this is most
likely to occur from the inside outward. Existing social groups with an
outside-inward development will most likely lead to short circuiting ex-
pected collective behavior in the larger society, such as public protests
and demonstrations, while created legal classes developed by the inside-
outward leadership of attorneys and social enterpreneurs will alter the
possible interactions with the legal system between the judiciary and the
legislative or administrative branches of government. These points are
summarized and presented in Figure 1. (See page 416).
The Implementation of Judicial Decisions
The second question was: How can courts implement decisions when
social institutions must change to carry them out?
From a sociological perspective, the function of the court is to apply
the existing norms of society to the case at hand."' This insures the ex-
istence of a consensual understanding between the parties involved that
I See Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 401, 409 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (Newsom
I); Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677, 686 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Lugo II.
Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. at 691-92 (Lugo II).
' See Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., No. 75-126, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 1979)
(Newsom II.
1' See M. WEBER, supra note 10, at 759.
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the decision carries with it a guarantee of coercive enforcement by the
agents of the state and that the parties concerned will act as if it were
obligatory. In other words, most lawyers and judges assume that there
will be compliance with court orders to change behavior.1
32
The courts can increase the probability that a consensual understand-
ing exists by relying heavily upon judicial precedent, textual interpreta-
tion of the law, or logical syllogisms. Beyond that, the courts themselves
actually operate without a guarantee that every decree will receive the
legal coercive power of the state to back it up and enforce it. Andrew
Jackson reportedly said, '"[John] Marshall has made his decision; now let
him enforce it' "" in reference to Supreme Court decisions in favor of
the Cherokee Nation and against the State of Georgia. 4 Other judicial
decrees have been ignored by the parties named,235 not enforced by the
executive,"6 or eventually retracted by the courts."7
In essence, courts depend upon the willingness of the parties involved
to enforce their orders. The court itself performs a function for the state
by legitimizing enforcement activities as it did in various school integra-
tion cases. The executive cannot enforce some laws, such as wiretaps or
other search procedures, without judicial approval. What the courts do
is to determine if the action will be in the national or public interest. 8
Generally the courts shy away from a showdown with the executive. 9
In Marbury v. Madison,240 Chief Justice Marshall had the choice of order-
ing Madison, then Secretary of State, to deliver a commission to Mar-
bury or to declare the act of Congress that permitted the appointment
to be unconstitutional. In this dilemma it was safer to declare the act
of a past Congress unconstitutional than to order Madison and Jefferson
to deliver the commission. In the real world of American politics, not on-
ly must truth and justice be served, but the normative wishes of the peo-
ple must be identified and powerful opponents mollified.24 '
In addition, the courts generally avoid regulatory or structural injunc-
tions that seek to control or direct behavior over long periods of time
See generally J. HANDLER, supra note 18; D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977).
2 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 551 (1919) (citing as earliest authority 1
H. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864)).
,' See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
See P. STRUM, THE SUPRMIE COURT AND "POLITICAL QESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVA.
SION 134 (1974) (discussing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 483 (1866)) (Attorney
General Stanbery's discussion of President Jefferson's refusal to respond to the Court's
subpoena in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692(d))).
See id. at 132-34 (discussing ExParte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861)).
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
See generally G. WILLS, supra note 227, at 127-61 (discussing legislative supremacy andjudicial review).
See generally id.
24Q 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
" See generally G. WILLS, supra note 227, at 127-61.
19821
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
or alter relationships among people, groups, or institutions. They are also
reluctant to establish elaborate machinery or to appoint an agent to
monitor or enforce their orders, relying instead on dissatisfied plaintiffs
to return to court. It is only in an unusual or extraordinary situation that
the courts will formulate and implement plans or manage and direct pro-
grams or organizations.24
If a party complains that another is not following a court order, the
courts have more success if the order was a negative one-one saying
"thou shalt not"- the violation of which is clearly visible.u Positive orders
often require a large decentralized bureaucracy with many employees
exercising a great deal of discretion to respond to a problem they have
successfully previously ignored."' The power of lower level participants
to thwart or accept organizational changes is well documented and in most
organizations a process of bargaining enables superiors to get lower level
participants to perform certain tasks in exchange for favors.245
The courts, however, are in a very poor position to become bargainers
with other social organizations or institutions. The most effective role
for the court is to mediate or arbitrate the disputes of others. In the Hill-
Burton suits, the most successful implementation was achieved by Judge
Comiskey in the Cook case. He encouraged the hospitals to draw up a
set of rules governing the community service and free care obligations
independently of and in the absence of HEW regulations.2"' The judge
did not attempt to order HEW to act; he merely allowed the freedom
and slack of the federal system to take its course. The ability of plaintiffs
representing the poor and medically indigent and several New Orleans
Hill-Burton-funded hospitals to agree upon a mutual set of rules did not
go unnoticed or unchallenged by the sluggish HEW bureaucracy. At that
time, had the courts chosen another course, such as imposing an injunc-
tion ordering the Secretary to write the regulations, holding a trial on
neglect of duty, or issuing a writ of mandamus, these actions might have
led to resistance by the bureaucracy instead of the promulgation of in-
terim regulations.
Five years, several decisions, and one congressional act later, the con-
sensual understanding of what HEW was supposed to do was much
stronger. The situation was ripe for a trial on the merits of neglect of
duty and for a threat to issue a writ of mandamus. When these options
emerged from the Lugo and Newsom cases, the Secretary filed an affidavit
promising new rules within a reasonable time and the bureaucracy cranked
24 See generally J. HANDLER, supra note 18; Comment, The Wyatt Case: Implementation
of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
243 J. HANDLER, supra note 18, at 18.
244 Id. at 18-20.
11 See generally M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964); R. HALL, ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1972); R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION (1967).
"' See note 89 supra.
[Vol. 57:385
THE HILL-BURTON CASES
them out even though the appeals court in Newsom would later state that
HEW could not really be ordered to do so.24'
Courts most effectively implement decisions when they can impose a
solution through a preventive injunction on a few people whose acts are
easily monitored.248 If these conditions are absent, as they all were in the
attempt to get HEW to issue regulations and then enforce the provisions
of the Hill-Burton Act, other strategies must be employed. The most suc-
cessful strategy was to beat the federal bureaucracy at its own game
by having the local parties draw up their own agreement in lieu of federal
regulations. It was only after a series of inadequate and half-hearted
responses on the part of HEW249 that the available arsenal of judicial cita-
tions, writs, and trials became at all effective. Plaintiffs in complex class
actions should not expect victory or successful implementation of a deci-
sion or decree in a single test case. The groundwork must be laid and
the situation allowed to ripen. Nevertheless, visible agreements between
the parties can provide immediate relief which can establish a precedent
for other disputes.
The Ability of Class Actions to Change Society
The third question was: What limits the ability of class action suits
to bring about changes in society?
The Hill-Burton class action suits appear to have been fairly successful
as a catalyst for broad legal change. Rules and regulations were clarified
and revised, the HEW bureaucracy was goaded into action, and Congress
considered several of these adjudicated issues when amending the Hill-
Burton Act in 1974. But the transformation of an individual's private
troubles into a social problem through class action suits may benefit the
class rather than the individual plaintiff directly. To maintain a class ac-
tion the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggest the court must find
that questions common to the class must predominate over the questions
affecting individual members of the class.-' In conformity, the appellate
court in Newsom noted that although the class may have a right to have
the hospital give benefits to some of the class members, thus providing
standing under the statute, no individual, "merely by being a member
of the class .... has a legitimate claim to free services . . 251 This is
a strong disincentive for individuals or attorneys to create a class action
suit for their own benefit. Ironically, Mrs. Newsom was the only plaintiff
in all the cases discussed in this article who received any personal tangi-
2.? See 653 F.2d 1100, 1122 (6th Cir. 1981) (Newsom III).
244 See generally J. HANDLER, supra note 18.
249 See notes 154-55 & accompanying text supra.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
"' Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 653 F.2d 1100, 1121 (6th Cir. 1981) (Newsom III).
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ble relief and benefits. But future services were not guaranteed to her
as an individual nor to any specific individual in the class. The suits were
not very successful, then, in distributing benefits to the plaintiffs. They
also had difficulty assessing costs on hospitals and agencies. In Eastern
Kentucky the plaintiffs were found to lack standing, and their attempt
to assess costs by challenging the tax-exempt status of hospitals was never
considered. 25 ' The Lugo plaintiffs were forced to abandon a similar cost
assessment strategy.253 The four main cases-Cook, Corum, Lugo, and
Newsom-failed to change the formula for measuring a hospital's
reasonable volume of free care and failed to extend the twenty-year limit
on its provisions. Only Newsom managed to demonstrate that Vanderbilt
University Hospital had not provided a reasonable volume of uncompen-
sated care and forced Vanderbilt to provide such services to make up
its deficit.54
Several reasons may explain this situation. First, when class action suits
peaked around 1975, the twenty-year limit on the free care obligation was
expiring or had expired for many hospitals across the country. In these
cases the courts were unwilling to assess costs retrospectively or to change
the time limit.
Second, the courts were reluctant to tamper with the established for-
mula for estimating the amount of free care provided. Almost any change
would have created a financial cost unrelated to the amount of the Hill-
Burton grant and the largest burdens would undoubtedly have fallen upon
those few Hill-Burton hospitals that regularly provided the bulk of care
to the poor and medically indigent.
Third, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to ascertain
whether a Hill-Burton hospital was providing its fair share of uncompen-
sated care in the community. The appeals court in Newsom noted that
"[i]n the present case, the parties stipulated that the need for free ser-
vices in the territorial area served by Vanderbilt Hospital was greater
than the hospital's Hill-Burton obligation." ' Similar sentiments were ex-
pressed by Judge Lasker in Corum. 6 These situations called for assess-
ing the costs of providing free care against all the hospitals in a com-
munity that received Hill-Burton funds by arguing that under the state
plans a joint responsibility existed. Only the Cook case named more than
one hospital as a defendant and none of the cases attempted to force the
creation of a defendant class of all Hill-Burton hospitals in the community.
The failure to effect change by having only a single hospital as defen-
See Eastern Ky. Welfare Right Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Eastern Kentucky III).
Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677, 686-89 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Lugo II).
Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 401, 418-19 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (Newsom
I).
653 F.2d at 1121 n.6 (Newsom III).
25 Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550., 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Corum II).
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dant rather than all the Hill-Burton hospitals in a community is further
evidenced in Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital Foundation.27
In Perry the plaintiffs alleged that Cafritz Hospital in southeast
Washington, D.C., disproportionately served suburban patients and ef-
fectively excluded many black and Medicaid-eligible city residents."8 The
plaintiffs sought an order under the community service obligation requir-
ing the hospital to distribute its patient services in ratios roughly pro-
portional to the geographic-and therefore economic and racial-
composition of the surrounding community.259
The Hill-Burton statute states: "[A]ssurance shall be received by the
State from the applicant that (1) the facility or portion thereof to be con-
structed or modernized will be made available to all persons residing in
the territorial area of the applicant .... "260 Judge Gesell found the then
current regulations merely parroted the language of the statute and, as
such, did not provide a sufficiently clear standard for the court to deter-
mine the territorial area of the hospital. Without such a standard "there
is no way that the Court can function except by considering itself some
kind of an administrative agency in a rule-making and administrative pro-
cess, which is not the role of the Court."26' Judge Gesell thought such
territorial decisions should not be made on a hospital-by-hospital basis,
but rather on a citywide or regional basis.
Had some of the other metropolitan Washington, D.C., hospitals fund-
ed under the Hill-Burton Act been included in the Perry suit, perhaps
Judge Gesell would have been forced to face the issue more squarely.
This possibility never arose because the defendant class was never created.
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the requirements
for creating a defendant class are rather limiting. Removing all such limits
creates the possibility of arbitrarily creating a defendant class of such
wide scope that it constitutes harassment and a legal nuisance. One of
the constraints on the ability of the Hill-Burton class action suits to change
society rests on their inability to create a reasonable and limited defen-
dant class. 62
'" No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972), reprinted in 2 HEALTH LAW PROJECT OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL, MATERIALS ON HEALTH LAW: THE HOSPITAL 81-82 (rev.
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as THE HOSPITAL] (cited and discussed in Rosenblatt, supra note
34, at 271 n.109).
' Id. (cited and discussed in Rosenblatt, supra note 34, at 274).
" Perry v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp. Found., No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972)
(cited and discussed in Note, supra note 131, at 329-30).
" 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976).
" Perry v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp. Found., No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972),
reprinted in 2 THE HOSPITAL, supra note 257, at 81-82 (cited and discussed in Rosenblatt, supra
note 34, at 275).
11 Since the number of hospitals in most American communities is less than 40 and each
hospital would contend that it wanted to protect its own interests, some difficulties hinder
the creation of a defendant class of Hill-Burton hospitals which have community service
obligations. The plaintiffs would need to show that the community service obligation is
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From a legal perspective, one plaintiff alone can litigate the validity
of federal regulations, an agency's failure to comply with statutory duties,
or a hospital's billing and collection practices. No class action is necessary.
But a sociological analysis suggests that a one-on-one approach of individual
plaintiff versus individual agency or facility is unlikely to be successful
when potential benefits are dispersed and the potential burden of costs
is concentrated.
From a sociological perspective, not only can a class of potential
beneficiaries be formed, but such plaintiffs could force the creation of
a limited class of defendants who will bear the burden of providing the
benefits. The existence of two rather well defined but limited classes
facilitates and sharpens the conflict . 6 3 This configuration also encourages
a neutral third party to act as mediator and permits settlement of the
dispute at the community level. 4 The alternatives are to claim the prob-
lem is beyond the control and responsibility of any single individual defen-
dant, who should not be required to assume the full burden of providing
benefits, or to claim that one must wait until a sufficient number of similar
cases suggest a general, solution to the problem.
CONCLUSION
This review and analysis of the Hill-Burton class action suits considered
them as that part of a social reform movement which provided both
organized structure and process for channeling discontent and disputes
into the judicial system for resolution. The impact of these cases can be
examined on both the macro and micro levels.
Most of the change occurred on the macro level and what really changed
were the laws and regulations.",' The twenty-year limit on community
service was voided and the community service regulations are now the
law and part of the health care reform component of Hill-Burton. The
Cook decision required all Hill-Burton facilities to participate in Medicaid
and this put the first teeth into the community service requirement. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the concept
of deficit makeup for Vanderbilt University Hospital if it could not
demonstrate compliance for specified years. The Cook, Euresti, and Perry
shared by all funded hospitals in the community or service district according to the state
Hill-Burton plan, and that creating a defendant class of such hospitals would acheive
economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniformity of decision as to those
hospitals and their obligations.
See generally T. CAPLOW, Two AGAINST ONE (1968); G. SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG
SIMMEL 145-69 (K. Wolff trans. 1950).
See generally T. CAPLOW, supra note 263; G. SIMMEL, supra note 263, at 145-69.
I Letter from Armin Freifeld, Staff attorney for the National Health Law Program
(Nhelp), to Harry Perlstadt (March 11, 1982) (Freifeld contends that the health reform
achievements of the cases under discussion were significant in establishing new legal rights
to remedy widespread wrongs).
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cases were all instrumental in convincing Congress to adopt a statutory
right to sue Hill-Burton facilities, thereby permitting and encouraging
litigation.
On the micro level, however, very little was changed for the individual
plaintiffs or for any particular individual in the plaintiff class. One reason
might be the key role played by attorneys as active participants in the
health law movement. They provided access to the courts and guided the
movement through the judicial process. But in most instances, rightly
or wrongly, this leadership did not reach down into the plaintiff class
and provide it with any skills or permanent organization through which
the plaintiffs might have pursued the benefits they won as a class. The
efforts of the attorneys were paramount, but confined to the adjudica-
tion process or to influencing the formation of legislation and regulations.
Class action suits are not a perfect substitute for a nonmiltitant social
movement that cultivates a broad range of grass roots support and pro-
vides leadership training for local activists. Under certain conditions,
however, class action suits can be part of an effective strategy of a reform
movement to bring about social change.

